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ABSTRACT 
An increasingly blurred understanding of the distinctive challenges posed to 
transplantation medicine and, by extension, public health, by the debilitating reality of 
alcoholism suggests a critical need to revisit the relationship between causality, 
candidacy, and culpability in light of substance addiction. This essay grounds its 
arguments in two, straightforward premises: (i) compassionate medical practice - 
understood as the sympathetic willingness to enter into the existential suffering of another 
in order to ameliorate the anguish invoked by disease - rests on the fiduciary relationship 
shared between provider and patient; and, (ii) allocating medical goods according to 
moral desert rather than existential disposition undermines the fundamental nature of 
medicine and the functioning of the provider-patient relationship. Drawing from this 
syllogism, the aim and proposal of this essay posits the argument that employing moral 
desert as an allocation criteria to inhibit alcoholic patients from equal consideration and 
treatment is, and ought to remain, at odds with the fundamental nature of medicine and 
the functioning of the provider-patient relationship. 
 






 The harmful use of alcohol (HUA) causes approximately 2.5 million global deaths 
each year, including 320,000 individuals between the ages of 15 and 29.1 The third 
leading risk factor of ill health world-wide, alcohol led to the death of one person every 
two minutes in the Americas in 2002.2 In the same year, approximately 5.4 percent of all 
deaths in the Americas were attributed to alcohol, compared to the 3.7 percent global 
figure – some 68 percent greater than the world average. Alcohol consumption is related 
to over 60 health conditions, ranging from those resulting from excessive alcohol 
consumption during pregnancy to intentional and non-intentional injuries, cancers, 
cardiovascular diseases, liver disease, and neuropsychiatric conditions, including alcohol 
dependence.3 An array of alcohol-related problems has a devastating impact on 
individuals and their families, and can seriously inhibit community life. HUA is one of 
the most common modifiable and preventable risk factors for major communicable 
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 diseases, and emerging evidence suggests that alcohol abuse contributes to health burdens 
caused by tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS.4 
 
 Alcohol has several and contrasting associations. A glass of wine can symbolize 
love, friendship, relaxation, and enjoyment. It can represent romance, success, beginnings 
and endings, good news and good company. But sadly, these occasions contrast with the 
associations of alcohol with drunken violence in towns and cities, terminal disease on 
medical wards, debt in families, and death on roads. It also contrasts with the 
enslavement that is alcoholism, or alcohol addiction. Addiction is concerned with the 
subjective experience of continuing in a habitual behavior which is recognized at some 
level (by the subject or others) as being undesirable. It is a concern with behavior in 
which motivation appears to be disordered, or in which the usual human experience of 
free choice appears to be violated.5  
 
Nevertheless, medical and moral arguments have been advanced in response to 
the question of whether alcoholic patients with liver disease should be given lower 
priority for liver transplantation than those whose disease is not alcohol related. 
According to the medical argument, alcoholics should be given lower priority because 
their survival rate is lower, owing to a presumed probability of relapse into alcohol abuse. 
According to the moral argument, alcoholics should be given lower priority because their 
moral vice of heavy drinking makes them responsible for their condition and effectively 
forfeits their claim to extraordinary medical treatment, such as transplantation.6 Contrary 
to these flawed positions, this essay will argue in favor of equal consideration for organ 
transplantation in alcoholic patients on both medical and moral grounds. 
 
1.2 Analytical Method 
 
 An increasingly blurred understanding of the distinctive challenges posed to 
transplantation medicine and, by extension, public health, by the debilitating reality of 
alcoholism suggests a critical need to revisit the relationship between causality, 
candidacy, and culpability in light of substance addiction. The be sure, the issues of 
immediate import to the conversation over the licitness of equal candidacy for organ 
transplantation in alcoholic patients in light of changing scientific, medical, and moral 
traditions are manifold, and any singular analysis of topics, no matter how sweeping, will 
unavoidably fall short of adequacy. This essay thus endeavors to briefly address but 
three: (i) alcohol addiction, (ii) transplantation candidacy, and (iii) moral responsibility.  
 
It grounds its arguments in two, straightforward premises: (i) compassionate 
medical practice – understood as the sympathetic willingness to enter into the existential 
suffering of another in order to ameliorate the anguish invoked by disease7 – rests on the 
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 fiduciary relationship shared between provider and patient; and (ii) allocating medical 
goods according to moral desert rather than existential disposition undermines the 
fundamental nature of medicine and the functioning of the provider-patient relationship. 
Drawing from this syllogism, the aim and proposal of this essay is to examine the notions 
of alcohol addiction, transplantation candidacy, and moral responsibility with the 
intention of positing the argument that employing moral desert as an allocation criteria to 
inhibit alcoholic patients from equal consideration and treatment is, and ought to remain, 
at odds with the fundamental nature of medicine and the functioning of the provider-
patient relationship.  
 
To secure the justification of this thesis, the essay will move in four parts. First, it 
will address alcoholism as a public health issue, including a specific analysis of (i) the 
pathophysiology and effects of alcoholism, (ii) alcoholism as a public health threat, and 
(iii) global strategies to address alcoholism. Second, it will address the neuroethics of 
alcoholism, including a specific analysis of (i) the addicted brain, (ii) the neurobiological 
basis of moral reasoning, and (iii) autonomy and alcoholism. Third, it will address organ 
transplantation and alcoholism, including a specific analysis of (i) liver transplantation 
and alcoholism, (ii) transplant outcome and survival benefit for alcoholic patients, and 
(iii) predictors of alcoholic relapse after liver transplantation. Finally, it will address 
moral responsibility and alcoholism, including a specific analysis of (i) free will, moral 
choice, and alcoholism, (ii) moral responsibility and alcoholism, and (iii) the provider-
patient relationship in the context of alcoholism. 
 
2. ALCOHOLISM AS PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUE 
 
2.1 Alcoholism: Pathophysiology and Effects 
 
 Addiction treatment trials often employ the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) definition of alcohol use disorders (AUD) to define 
study participants. The definition of alcohol dependence requires significantly harmful 
impact caused by at least three of seven target conditions within a single calendar year. 
The dependence symptoms include tolerance; withdrawal; increased amounts of alcohol 
consumed over time; ineffective efforts to reduce use; interference with professional or 
personal life; significant amount of time spent obtaining, using, and recovering from 
alcohol; or continued use of alcohol despite harmful sequelae.8  
 
The DSM-V has combined criteria for alcohol dependence and abuse into a single 
term: AUD.9 Craving was added to the diagnostic criteria and at least two target 
conditions are required for AUD. Although approved pharmacologic treatment options 
for patients with AUD are limited in number, recent trials describe several alternative 
approaches to reducing alcohol consumption. These include the use of antipsychotics, 
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 antidepressants, anticonvulsants, and other drugs under the rationale that these substances 
target neurotransmitter systems that have been shown to undergo changes with chronic 
exposure to alcohol.10 
 
 The acute and chronic effects of alcohol on brain pathology help to rationalize the 
investigations of psychotropic drugs in the treatment of AUD.11 Alcohol, like other 
addictive drugs, stimulates release of the neurotransmitter dopamine from cells 
originating in the ventral tegmental area (VTA).12 Following exposure to alcohol, 
dopamine released into the nucleus accumbens (NAc) and prefrontal cortex has been 
postulated to reinforce drinking behaviors or make the experience of drinking more 
salient. This electrochemical activation of neurons is controlled by a balance between 
excitatory and inhibitory neurotransmitters.13 
 
Alcohol acutely inhibits the flow of ions through N-methyl-D-asparate (NDMA)-
type glutamine receptors and enhances the activity of glutamate, γ-aminobutyric acid 
(GABA) receptors channels, producing an overall inhibitory effect on neurons.14 The 
desire to relieve anxiety and negative sensations of withdrawal can contribute to relapse 
drinking and compulsive behaviors that characterize alcohol dependence. Pharmacologic 
strategies to reduce drinking in patients with AUD attempt to remedy the imbalance 
between excitatory and inhibitory pathways, and relieve the intense craving for alcohol 
brought about by neuroadaptation.15 
 
 Even in healthy individuals, alcohol is toxic to most organ systems at doses above 
one to two drinks per day.16 Long-term exposure to alcohol generally increases the risk of 
damage to gastrointestinal, cardiovascular, immune, nervous, and other systems. Alcohol 
can promote gastrointestinal bleeding through inflammation of the esophagus and 
stomach, or through vomiting that can damage gastrointestinal mucosa. Acute 
pancreatitis is more prevalent in alcoholics than in the general population and can 
progress to chronic disease or pancreatic cancer with prolonged abuse. Accumulation of 
fat in the liver as a result of decreased oxidation of fatty acids and other metabolic 
changes can progress to fatty liver disease, alcohol-induced hepatitis, and cirrhosis.17  
 
The effects of heavy drinking can range from left ventricular impairment and 
arrhythmia to heart failure as a result of limited contractility of the heart muscle. Binge 
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 drinking can produce atrial and ventricular arrhythmias, even in individuals who have no 
other evidence of heart disease – a syndrome known as “holiday heart.”18 Alcohol-
dependent individuals may experience peripheral neuropathy characterized by numbness 
and tingling, especially in the hands and feet. A progressive neurological syndrome that 
affects walking and posture, often accompanied by nystagmus, can result from atrophy of 
the cerebellum due to alcohol toxicity. Less common are neurologic syndromes that 
result from thiamine deficiency secondary to heavy drinking. Wernicke’s syndrome 
consists of encephalopathy, uncoordinated muscle movement, eye and muscle weakness; 
and Korsakoff’s syndrome is characterized by amnesia.19 
 
2.2 Alcoholism qua Public Health Threat 
 
 HUA has serious effects on public health and is considered a primary risk factor 
for poor health globally. HUA is broad and includes drinking that poses debilitating 
health consequences for the drinker and society at large, as well as the patterns of 
drinking associated with adverse health outcomes. HUA compromises both individual 
and social development, and can ruin the lives of individuals, devastate families, and 
damage the social fabric of communities. As mentioned above, HUA is a significant 
contributor to the global burden of disease and is listed as the third leading risk factor for 
premature deaths and disabilities in the world.20  
 
The degree of risk for HUA varies with age, sex, and other biological 
characteristics of the consumer as well as with the setting and context in which drinking 
takes place. Some vulnerable and at-risk groups have increased susceptibility to the toxic, 
psychoactive, and dependence-producing properties of ethanol. At the same time, low 
risk patterns of alcohol consumption at the individual level may not be associated with 
occurrence or significantly increased probability of negative health and social 
consequences. Reducing HUA by effective policy measures that provide a relevant 
infrastructure is much more than a public health issue. It is also a developmental issue, 
since the level of risk in developing countries is much higher than in high-income 
countries where individuals are protected by laws and interventions.21 
 
A substantial scientific knowledge base exists on the effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness of strategies and interventions to prevent and reduce alcohol-related harm.22 
Although much of the evidence comes from high-income countries, the results of meta-
analyses and reviews provide sufficient knowledge to inform policy recommendations. 
With improved awareness, there are increased responses at regional, notational, and 
international levels. Yet these responses are often fragmented and do not always 
correspond to the magnitude of impact on health and social development.23 The present 
commitment to reducing HUA provides an excellent opportunity for improving health 
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 and social well-being and for reducing the existing disease burden attributed by alcohol. 
There are at least seven considerable challenges that must be accounted for in national 
and global public health initiatives and programs, of which this essay will address four.24 
 
 A first challenge is increasing global action and international cooperation.25 The 
current health, cultural, and market trends worldwide indicate that HUA will remain a 
global health issue. These trends should be recognized, and appropriate responses should 
be implemented at all levels. Second, intersectoral action must be ensured.26 The 
diversity of alcohol-related problems and measures necessary to reduce alcohol-related 
harm suggests the need for comprehensive action across numerous sectors. Policies to 
reduce HUA must reach beyond the health sector and appropriately engage sectors such 
as development, justice, social welfare, trade, education, and others.27  
 
Third, appropriate attention must be accorded to this issue.28 Preventing and 
reducing HUA is infrequently prioritized by decision makers despite compelling evidence 
of its debilitating public health effects. Unless this problem is given the attention it 
deserves, the spread of harmful drinking practices and norms will continue. Fourth, 
equity must be a focal point.29 Population-wide rates of drinking alcoholic beverages are 
markedly lower in poor societies than in wealthier ones. However, for a given amount of 
consumption, poorer populations often experience disproportionately higher levels of 
alcohol-attributed harm. This suggests an urgent need to develop and implement effective 
policies and programs that reduce such social disparities.30 
 
2.3 Global Strategies to Address Alcoholism 
 
 National and international efforts can produce better results when they are 
supported by regional and global action within agreed policy frames. Hence, the purpose 
of an effective global strategy is to support and compliment public health policies in 
Member States. The vision behind the global strategy to reduce alcohol-related harm is 
improved health and social outcomes for individuals, families, and communities with 
considerably reduced morbidity and mortality due to HUA. A robust global strategy will 
promote and support local, regional, and global actions to prevent and reduce HUA. One 
global strategy, developed by the World Health Organization and endorsed by the Sixty-
third World Health Assembly,31 aims to guide action at all levels. These 
recommendations set priority areas for global action, and offer a portfolio of policy 
options and measures to consider for implementation. As such, they can nuanced as 
appropriate at the national level, taking into account relevant circumstances, such as 
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 religious and cultural contexts, public health priorities, and existing resources, capacities, 
and capabilities.32 
 
 Five aims comprise the WHO’s global strategy.33 First, the it suggests raised 
global awareness of the magnitude and nature of health, social, and economic problems 
caused by HUA, and increased governmental commitment to address HUA. Second, it 
suggests a strengthened knowledge base around the magnitude and determinants of 
alcohol-related harm and on effective interventions to reduce and prevent such harm. 
Third, it suggests increased technical support to, and enhanced capacity of, Member 
States for preventing HUA and managing AUDs and associated health conditions.34 
Fourth, it suggests strengthened partnerships and better coordination among stakeholders 
and increased mobilization of resources necessary for appropriate and coordinated action 
to prevent HUA. Finally, it suggests improved systems for monitoring and surveillance at 
different levels, and more effective dissemination and application of the information for 
advocacy, policy development, and evaluation purposes. Achieving these five objectives 
requires local, regional, and global actions on the levels, patterns, and contexts of alcohol 
consumption and the broader social determinants of health.35 
 
 The protection of population health by preventing and reducing HUA is a public 
health priority. To this end, the WHO offers eight principles to guide the development 
and implementation of policies at all levels, of which this essay will address five.36 First, 
public policies and interventions to prevent and reduce alcohol-related harm should be 
guided and formulated by public health interests and based on clear public health goals 
and the best available evidence.37 Second, policies should be equitable and sensitive to 
national, religious, and cultural contexts.38 Third, all involved parties must act in ways 
that do not undermine the implementation of public policies and interventions to prevent 
and reduce HUA.39 Fourth, public health should be given proper respect in relation to 
competing interests, and approaches that support that direction should be promoted.40 
Finally, individuals and families affected by HUA should have access to affordable and 
effective prevention and care services.41 Taken together, these principles reflect the 
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 multifaceted determinants of alcohol-related harm and the coordinated multisectoral 
actions required to implement effective interventions.  
 
3. THE NEUROETHICS OF ALCOHOLISM 
 
3.1 The Addicted Brain 
 
 Communication in the brain is facilitated by neurotransmitters, which are released 
from neurons at synapses where they interact as bonds with protein complexes, called 
receptors, on the surface of other cells, predominantly at the postsynaptic membrane. The 
binding of a neurotransmitter to a receptor transduces a chemical signal that transfers 
activity-dependent information. The neurotransmitters can either be taken back up by the 
cell for future use by transporters or degraded and removed from the system. In the brain, 
pathways are complex integrative systems that contain numerous neurons or nuclei that 
relay information throughout a circuit and can be acted upon by other neurotransmitter 
systems that also integrate with that region.42 While alcohol has diverse pharmacological 
profiles, its acute actions converge primarily on the mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic 
system. This pathway originates in the VTA and projects to the NAc, striatum, forebrain, 
and prefrontal cortex. The prefrontal cortex coordinates cognitive processes and actions 
aimed at an internal goal, while the NAc is believed to integrate information, effect an 
appropriate response, and control the motivational value of stimuli and reward 
enforcement.43 
 
 Immediately after initial exposure to a drug, extracellular levels of accumbal 
dopamine increase. Some enhance dopamine release from the presynaptic terminals as a 
consequence of increased neuronal activity in the VTA (e.g., alcohol, nicotine, opiates, 
and cannabis) while others inhibit the presynaptic uptake by the dopamine transporter 
(DAT) in the NAc (e.g., cocaine and amphetamines).44 Alcohol produces a larger 
dopamine release that is maintained for longer than that of natural rewards. If exposure to 
the drug persists, there may be a loss of homeostatic regulation: a progressive increase in 
basal levels of dopamine is accompanied by a reduction in the lesser response to the drug, 
resulting in the appearance of tolerance to the drug. During acute alcohol withdrawal, the 
levels of dopamine rebound to below basal levels so re-exposure to the drug or a drug-
related cue is often sufficient to increase dopamine levels again. This dopamine response 
has been hypothesized to contribute to addictive relapse.45 
 
While dopamine release may modulate the acute rewarding effects of alcohol, it 
does not solely mediate drug-seeking behaviors and persistent drug taking. Exposure to 
alcohol can have either a direct or indirect effect on numerous neurotransmitter 
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 systems.46 Unlike dopamine, which facilitates the response to initial alcohol use, these 
additional neurotransmitter systems play a greater role in mediating persistent drug use, 
contributing to the inability to stop drug use and relapse after a period of abstinence.47 
 
 There are vast numbers of neuropeptides and their receptors present in pathways 
that mediate alcohol addiction.48 The role of corticotropin-releasing factor (CFR) is 
highlighted as an example of the intricate part that neuropeptides play in mediating 
addictive behaviors. Stress, either in the environment or due to alcohol withdrawal, can 
induce drug craving, which leads to relapse. The system mediating stress responses 
incorporates the hypothalamic pituitary axis (HPA) ad extrahypothalmic regions (such as 
the extended amygdala). CRF is a neuropeptide that is responsible for activating the 
HPA, where it plays a mediating role in hormonal, autonomic, emotional, and behavioral 
responses to stress. Initial exposure to alcohol engages the HPA, but this response 
becomes blunted with repeated exposures via feedback systems in response to circulating 
hormones.49 
 
CFR-mediated actions on addictive behaviors depend on their interplay at 
extrahypothalmic sites. These extrahypothalmic regions become sensitized to CRF after 
repeated exposure to alcohol abuse. During withdrawal, these regions become engaged 
and hyperactive, thereby increasing local CRF levels and perpetuating negative state of 
stress. While stress is sufficient to increase CRF levels in the VTA, it is neuroadaptive 
changes induced by prior alcohol abuse that enable the CRF to control local glutamate 
release, subsequently activating the dopaminergic system and perpetuating stress-induced 
relapse to drug-seeking behaviors.50 
 
3.2 The Neurobiological Basis of Moral Reasoning 
 
 The brain region associated with moral reasoning and decision making is the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). This region is primarily associated with 
cognition, but it reaches to other cortical and subcortical regions mediating emotions, 
which in turn project to the VMPFC. Interaction between these neural pathways 
facilitates the cognitive and affective processes responsible for deliberating and making 
rational moral decisions.51 Antonio Damasio has observed that damage to and 
dysfunction in the VMPFC significantly impairs both cognitive and affective 
processing.52 This is due to the associated projections of the VMPFC to regions beyond 
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 51. For a superb account of the neurobiological basis of morality, see Christopher Suhler, and 
Patricia Churchland, “The Neurobiological Basis of Morality,” in The Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics, 
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 the prefrontal area. The system that supports moral decision making includes the 
dorsolateral prefrontal regions as well as “higher-order” association cortices in the 
temporal and parietal regions, the early sensory cortices, and several regions of the motor 
system, cortically and subcortically,53 as well as other cortical sites.54 Of critical 
takeaway here is the notion decision making and emotional systems overlap and interact 
within the VMPFC,55 which is damaged by alcohol addiction. 
 
 Insofar as the VMPFC is vital for decision making, and both cognitive and 
emotional systems are active within the VMPFC, it follows that decision making is a 
process both cognitive and emotional. Damasio and colleagues have displayed that 
emotional impairment in psychopaths or sociopaths correlate with irrational choices 
founded upon faulty moral judgments,56 and a similar impairment is true of individuals 
with addiction. Unlike (spontaneous) intuitive moral judgments, considered moral 
judgments involve a depth of reflection and formulation of reasons for or against 
particular actions.57 
 
This data suggests that the interplay between cognitive and affective processes 
ground one’s capacity to actively participate in practical moral reasoning. Both respective 
processes are indispensable to the capacity to make considered moral judgments about 
conflicting values. Such considered judgments require more than immediate or slightly 
delayed responses. That is, moral judgments require some degree of critical reflective 
thought, whereby one takes longer to justify actions that pose polarized consequences.58 
 
3.3 Autonomy and Alcoholism 
 
 Autonomy is a term with multiple meanings. In its maximal sense, autonomy 
means that human beings possess only the desires and beliefs they want to have and make 
choices uninfluenced by any factor they have not endorsed. Yet, if autonomy is thus 
understood, it is not a goal that human beings can hope to achieve. As finite beings, 
individuals are forced to strive for something less grandiose. Certainly, if addiction 
threatens autonomy (as it seems to do), then it must be some less extravagant notion of 
autonomy that it undermines. In a more minimal sense, then – as the etymology of the 
world itself suggests – autonomy (auto nomos, or “self rule”) is simply self-government. 
Just as autonomous nations are able to make major decisions of internal and external 
policy without undue interference from foreign powers, so autonomous persons are 
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 capable of governing themselves by setting their own short and long-term ends and 
choosing the best means of achieving them.59  
 
However, if autonomy is understood as self-rule, it is not yet clear how the loss of 
autonomy should be understood. One obvious situation in which autonomy is 
compromised or lost is when the self is ruled by another. In the political domain, the loss 
of autonomy is almost exclusively described this way. The same kind of phenomenon can 
occur, more or less dramatically, in the alcoholic as well. A slave, for instance, whose life 
is entirely in the hands of another, is a dramatic example of this phenomenon, while a 
dispositionally subservient person might represent a less dramatic instance of this partial 
loss of autonomy.60 
 
 At first blush, addiction does not seem to involve the loss of autonomy described 
above. The alcoholic who suffers loss of autonomy is not under the control of another 
person, either partially or necessarily. An addict might be excessively subservient to the 
individual who supplies him with alcohol, or with money for alcohol, and therefore have 
his autonomy compromised by the rule of another. However, if the addict’s autonomy is 
compromised in this way, it marks a consequence of an initial loss of autonomy that is 
characteristic of addiction. This initial loss of autonomy has left the addict vulnerable to 
this subservience, since it is the addiction that gives the individual who controls him 
undue influence. Furthermore, there need not be another party exercising undue influence 
over the addict to experience a weakening of autonomy.  
 
The individual who is able to supply his habit is unlikely to be at the control of 
another as the consequence of addiction. It is sometimes postulated that addicts are 
controlled by the drugs they abuse. Carl Elliot, for instance, writes that the addict must go 
where addiction leads, because the addiction “holds the leash.”61 Elliot’s imagery is, of 
course, a metaphor: an addiction cannot hold a leash, is not an agent, and has no desires 
or goals of its own. If addiction involves the loss of autonomy, then it must somehow 
undercut the addict’s ability to pursue his own goals. This essay contends that addicts 
have compromised self-government even though they are not under the strict rule of 
anyone else.62 
 
4. ORGAN TRANSPLATATION AND ALCOHOLISM 
 
4.1 Liver Transplantation and Alcoholism 
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  Alcoholic liver disease (ALD) is among the most common causes and indications 
for orthotopic liver transplantation (OLT) in Europe and North America.63 ALD ranges 
from steatosis or steatofibrosis to liver cirrhosis. Acute alcoholic hepatitis is a syndrome 
presenting as acute liver damage following recent excessive drinking and is associated 
with poor prognosis. Many patients with severe alcoholic hepatitis, whether occurring in 
the previously healthy liver or in patients with established cirrhosis, fail to recover 
despite abstinence and maximal medical therapy. The development of acute renal failure 
in the midst of acute alcoholic hepatitis indicates an especially grim prognosis. Most 
transplant programs in the United States and Europe require a minimal interval of 
abstinence for six months prior to transplantation for patients with decompensated liver 
disease. If there is no substantial improvement after three months of medical 
management, including alcohol abstinence, the chances of spontaneous recovery by 
patients with acute hepatitis and cirrhosis are poor.64 
 
 Liver transplantation in patients with alcoholic cirrhosis was first acknowledged 
by the statement of the National Institutes of Health Consensus on Liver Transplantation 
in 1983. As the statement notes, patients with alcoholic liver disease who are judged 
likely to abstain from alcohol and have established clinical indicators of fatal outcome 
may indeed be candidates for liver transplantation.65 In 1997, a conference (under the 
auspices of the National Institutes of Health) on liver transplantation in ALD patients 
confirmed the positive outcome of liver transplantation for most patients with alcoholic 
liver cirrhosis, strongly encouraged efforts to understand the mechanisms leading some 
patients to relapse, and called for adaptations to patient management protocols to restrict 
risk of relapse and graft loss.66 The efficacy of liver transplantation for alcoholic cirrhosis 
was best demonstrated by T. Poynard, who employed modeling techniques to exhibit 
survival benefit when patients with advanced decompensation (i.e., 11-15 points on the 
Child-Turcotte-Pugh (CTP) scoring system) underwent transplantation. There was no 
survival benefit when alcoholic patients with better-compensated liver function were 
transplanted.67 
 
 In the past, assessing the risk of death among patients with alcoholic cirrhosis has 
depended on CTP classification. In recent years, however, a new prognostic system, 
known as the Model for End-Stage Liver Disease (MELD), predicts liver disease severity 
on the basis of serum creatinine, serum total bilirubin, and INR.68 Previous studies have 
failed to demonstrate that other clinical manifestations of liver decompensation, such as 
variceal hemorrhage, hepatic encephalopathy, new onset ascites, or spontaneous bacterial 
peritonitis, were independent predictors of survival over and above the MELD score. 
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 Nonetheless, the onset of any of these features in an abstinent alcoholic should prompt 
managing clinicians to consider referral to a transplant center.69 In addition to evaluating 
the severity of liver disease and its complications, the pre-transplant investigation is 
based on assessing the patient’s general health, especially the conditions and 
comorbidities that might limit the potential for successful surgery, such as pancreatitis, 
central and peripheral neuropathy, heart disease, myopathy, renal insufficiency, and poor 
nutritional status. Chronic alcohol abuse is associated with impaired lymphocyte 
recruitment, which may explain the increased morbidity and mortality of pulmonary 
infections in alcoholic patients.70 
 
4.2 Transplant Outcome and Survival Benefit for Alcoholic Patients 
 
 According to a 2011 report from the European Liver Transplant Registry, post- 
OLT actuarial survival rates for end-stage ALD were higher than those of patients 
transplanted for hepatitis viral infection.71 Similar survival rates for ALD patients have 
been reported in the United States: 92% at one year; 86% at three and five years, and 
76% at nine years.72 Indeed, ALD patients had similar, if not better, patient and graft 
survival rates than other indications. Few studies are available on the outcome of patients 
undergoing OLT for ALD in light of associated co-morbid factors of liver damage, the 
most common of which is chronic hepatitis C virus (HCV). Despite data reporting a more 
rapid progression of liver disease in immunocompetent patients with the combination of 
ALD and HCV, a study by V. Aguilera and colleagues found that patients transplanted 
for ALD plus HCV had a better survival rate than patients with HCV alone and a similar 
survival rate to those with ALD alone.73 
 
 The long-term morbidity and survival rate of transplanted ALD patients can be 
impaired by a high rate of medical complications, especially de novo cancer. In a group 
of selected ALD patients who underwent OLT, A. Jain and colleagues reported that five 
year patient and graft survival was significantly lower than that of non-alcoholic cirrhotic 
controls, due primarily to cardiorespiratory, cerebrovascular, and neoplastic problems.74 
Recent studies have shown a higher rate of de novo malignancy, not only in active 
smokers after OLT, but also in patients with a history of smoking prior to transplantation, 
which accounts for approximately 75% in the ALD population.75  
 
A greater incidence of post-OLT neurological complications has also been 
reported in patients transplanted for ALD compared to transplant recipients with other 
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 etiologies.76 A further concern with ALD patients undergoing OLT is the lack of 
compliance with clinical protocols and immunosuppressive therapy. However, this seems 
to be an assumption rather than an evidence-based conclusion. Although poor compliance 
with immunosuppressive drugs was reported to be responsible for late rejection and graft 
failure in heavy drinkers after OLT, several studies have demonstrated that ALD patients 
show fewer episodes of acute cellular rejection than do patients transplanted for other 
etiologies.77 
 
 These results raise numerous questions concerning whether a system based on 
benefit calculation can be implemented equitably and practically. First, allocating organs 
on the basis of projected survival benefit – herein understood as the balance between 
waiting list mortality and post liver transplantation morality – represents a true paradigm 
shift.78 The current principle in organ transplantation – namely, transplanting the sickest 
patient first – has served well because it makes the allocation process transparent and 
because the benefit of liver transplantation is mostly dominated by waiting list mortality. 
Following the initial learning curve about the MELD score, the liver transplant 
community has embraced the scoring system because of its simplicity and objectivity.79 
 
The ultimate question of whether the benefit model should be adopted will depend 
on the magnitude of the benefit: how many lives will eventually be saved by directing 
some of the organs from one group of patients – namely, those at the highest risk of 
waiting list mortality – to another – that is, those who are expected to have the better 
post-transplantation outcome. If a benefit-based transplantation policy is to be adopted, 
the transplant community must be willing to accept this departure from traditional 
thinking. Because some patients with ALD will experience a good outcome, they will be 
placed at higher priority than patients without ALD who face the same (or even higher) 
risk of death while waiting.80 
 
4.3 Predictors of Alcoholic Relapse After Liver Transplantation 
 
 Although transplant outcome and survival benefit remain crucial endpoints by the 
Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients, an increasing emphasis has been placed on 
morbidity after solid organ transplantation.81 The recurrence of the original disease, the 
development of new diseases, the morbid consequences of immunosuppression, and the 
mental health of the transplant recipient all contribute to a more comprehensive 
understanding of the lives of transplant recipients. As such, alcohol abuse after 
transplantation is an area of cardinal importance in assessing the recipient’s projected 
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 quality of life. Unfortunately, there are numerous barriers to obtaining accurate data 
about alcohol use by transplant recipients. Several of the most common methods, such as 
self-reports, assessment by clinical findings, and collateral reports, are subject to bias. In 
particular, the lack of an objective and reliable instrument to measure alcohol 
consumption and the risk to the recipient that candor about alcohol use could harm his 
chances of receiving future care from the transplant program encourage underreporting.82 
 
 Given the aforementioned caveat, the difficulty to apply tools of meta-analysis to 
assess the frequency of addictive behavior after liver transplantation is understandable. 
Against this backdrop, the study of M. A. Dew and colleagues is all the more laudable. In 
their paper, Dew and colleagues successfully concentrate on liver transplant recipients 
and seek to discover how frequently these patients’ addictions relapse after 
transplantation.83 According to their meta-analysis, when alcoholic liver disease is the 
pre-transplant diagnosis, six of 100 recipients per year will use alcohol after 
transplantation, and less than three will resume heavy alcohol use. For the addiction 
specialist, the maintenance of sobriety after transplantation is surprising.84 Possible 
explanations include (i) the consequence of liver transplant recipients being a highly 
selected population with less craving for alcohol than typical alcoholics, (ii) a result of 
potential therapeutic properties of transplantation on addictions, or (iii) an underestimate 
inasmuch as alcoholic transplant recipients hide their drinking.85 
 
 At least three pre-transplant factors assist in predicting alcoholic relapse after 
transplantation: (i) lack of social support, (ii) family history of alcoholism, and (iii) less 
than six months of abstinence from alcohol. Both social support and family history 
resonate with studies conducted by George Vaillant in nontransplant alcoholic 
populations.86 However, the six-month period of abstinence is a more questionable 
prognostic tool.87 Use of the six-month rule to select alcoholic patients for liver 
transplantation is nearly universal, and this exerts profound bias on meta-analysis insofar 
as patients with the highest risk – those with less than six months of abstinence – are 
likely to have been excluded before the data was collected.88  
 
The vast majority of relapses in Vaillant’s 2003 follow-up study occurred before 
the seventh year of abstinence.89 By analogy to the cancer-free period as a definition of 
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 cure, Vaillant concludes that a follow-up study of five years rather than one or two years 
would be necessary to determine stable recovery from alcoholism.90 The absence of a link 
between pre-transplant rehabilitation treatment and post-transplant alcoholic relapse is an 
unexpected finding.91 Nevertheless, predicting future alcohol relapse remains imperfect, 
and future studies will need to confront the issue of suitability for transplantation of 
patients with durations of abstinence shorter than six months.92 
 
5. MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ALCOHOLISM 
 
5.1 Free Will, Moral Choice, and Alcoholism 
 
Cognitive and affective neuroscience has generated significant insight into the 
neurobiological basis of the capacity for practical and moral reasoning. Experiments 
exposing human subjects to functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scans during 
participation in stimulating cognitive tasks have conclusively identified inter-
relationships between the brain and mental states, each of which play vital roles in 
deliberation and decision making. This comprehensive imaging has shown that desires, 
beliefs, emotions, and intentions that serve as the impetus for action are mediated by the 
interplay between cortical and subcortical networks in the brain.93 Some cognitive 
neuroscientists and psychologists have contended that the relationship between the brain 
and behavior indicates that cognitive function can be explained in terms of unconscious 
mechanistic processes in the brain.94 This suggests that the source of one’s actions (i.e., 
one’s positive will) is not within one’s control,95 and that one’s mental state has no causal 
role in manufacturing them.96 
 
 This essay understands free will as the capacity to respond to reasons and to make 
choices in accord with one’s mental state by controlling the role each plays in one’s 
actions.97 It therefore contends, contrary to the position above,98 that any reasonable 
conception of free will is consistent with the notion that some cognitive states can 
causally influence actions while having physical causes in the brain. That is, because the 
brain generates the mind, and the mind in turn can influence the brain, a plausible 
account of human (moral) agency must include both unconscious physical and conscious 
mental states and events as causes of human action. This point suggests that 
neuroscientific evidence cannot be used as a counterargument to the possibility of 
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 personal moral responsibility insofar as nothing about normal brain function suggests that 
one lacks the capacity to choose and act freely.99 For better or worse and in varying 
degrees, then, one is responsible one’s actions. 
 
 However, impaired control over voluntary behavior is a marked feature in 
emerging neurobiological explanations of addiction, in clinical and diagnostic accounts, 
and in debates about addiction nosology.100 There is growing evidence that chronic, 
sustained abuse of alcohol is associated with neurocognitive changes and deficits, as 
revealed by neuroimaging studies and neuropsychological testing.101 Others studies 
propose that chronic exposure to alcohol sets in motion neurobiological processes that 
result in the overvaluing of the reinforcing properties of a substance or behavior and an 
undervaluing of natural reinforcers (e.g., maintaining relationships, going to work, 
etc.).102 These processes are associated with impaired voluntary control over one’s 
behavior. Similarly, individuals experiencing addiction have neurological impairments 
that weaken their ability to make voluntary decisions in the service of long-term 
outcomes. Hence, alcoholic cravings can manifest as such irresistible and powerful 
psychological forces that someone with an addiction is not capable, at certain times, of 
acting fully autonomously when the decision involves denying the persistence of 
cravings.103 
 
5.2 Moral Responsibility and Alcoholism 
 
 The primary reason philosophers have agued against providing patients with end-
stage ALD an equal chance to compete for liver transplantation is that alcoholics are 
somehow morally responsible for their condition.104 The fundamental premises of the 
argument are straightforward: (i) alcoholics are morally responsible for their medical 
conditions; and (ii) patients who are morally responsible for their medical conditions 
should be given lower priority for medical resources for their conditions when they are in 
competition with those who are not morally responsible for their conditions. Following 
this logic, the syllogistic conclusion is that alcoholics with end-stage ALD should be 
given lower priority for medical resources (e.g., livers) when they are in competition with 
those who are not morally responsible for their conditions.105  
 
 However, whether alcoholics are morally responsible for their liver conditions 
depends on whether they are responsible for their alcoholism in the first place. If 
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 alcoholics are not responsible for their alcoholism, then it would be wrong to treat them 
differently from patients who develop liver diseases for reasons beyond their control. The 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention defines alcoholism as “a primary, chronic 
disease with genetic, psychosocial, and environmental factors influencing its 
development and manifestations.”106 In addition, the American Medical Association 
endorses the proposition that “drug dependencies, including alcoholism, are diseases” and 
that “their treatment is a legitimate part of medical practice.”107  
 
Much of the contemporary discussion over end-stage ALD and livers centers on 
the question of whether alcoholism is a disease, traditionally understood. Nevertheless, 
settling this question will not, in and of itself, determine the issue of responsibility for 
that disease. Hepatitis C is undoubtedly a disease, but if one were to expose oneself 
deliberately to the hepatitis C virus with the intention of developing the disease, one 
would be both causally and morally responsible for the condition. Thus, the issue in 
question is not whether alcoholism is a disease per se (though it most certainly is); rather, 
the focus should be on whether alcoholics are morally responsible for their alcoholism.108 
 
 On this issue, philosophers continue to disagree. Walter Glannon, for instance, 
argues that although environmental factors such as a family history of alcoholism, 
preexisting psychiatric conditions, gender, and genetic factors all increase the risk of 
developing alcoholism, alcoholics can still be morally responsible for their condition. He 
contends that regardless of the high risk of developing alcoholism, one always has the 
ability to refrain from drinking.109 Combine that ability with knowledge of one’s 
dispositions and health risks (an argument Glannon appropriates from Book III of 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics110) along with acceptance of lower priority for liver 
transplantation, one ought to be held responsible for one’s alcoholism and its associated 
diseases.111 Robert Veatch advances a similar claim: while many conclude that 
alcoholism has nonvoluntary components, it also contains significant opportunity for 
voluntary decision making.112 Veatch’s conclusion is that if the alcoholic had the 
opportunity for significant choice, then he should be responsible for the consequences, 
including lower priority for liver transplantation.113  
 
 The disagreements about whether alcoholics cause their own end-stage ALD 
reveal more than the problems confronted in determining their level of moral 
responsibility. Take, for instance, the strategy of Alvin Moss and Mark Siegler of 
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 assigning responsibility on the basis of an alcoholic’s failure to seek treatment for his 
alcoholism.114 This argument is meant to improve the attempt to hold alcoholics 
responsible for their alcoholic abuse per se. However, this strategy seems no more 
reliable in evaluating moral responsibility than simply blaming alcoholics for their 
alcoholism.115 
 
Against this logic, Dien Ho considers the alcoholic who has failed to seek 
treatment because he is preoccupied with an ailing mother who requires constant 
assistance.116 In Ho’s example, the son is too poor to hire help, and the closest Alcoholics 
Anonymous meeting takes place in a city that is more than a two-hour drive away. Worse 
still, he has no car. These hypothetical circumstances – which are surely realities for 
some – illuminate Ho’s position: it would be unreasonable to conclude that the man in 
this example is responsible enough for his condition that he should receive lower priority 
for liver transplantation.117 
 
 Ho’s point is not that alcoholics should be excused entirely, but that the 
assessment of moral responsibility in cases similar to his example are extremely difficult, 
if not entirely impossible. Carl Cohen, Martin Benjamin, and the Ethics and Social 
Impact Committee of Transplant and Health Policy Center have articulated this problem 
well.118 They outline three technical problems with the use of moral responsibility as a 
criteria for the allocation of livers to alcoholics: “(1) We have genuine and well-rounded 
doubts about comparative degrees of voluntariness and, therefore, cannot pass judgment 
fairly; (2) Even if we could assess degrees of voluntariness reliably, we cannot know 
what penalties different degrees of misconduct deserve; (3) Judgments of this kind could 
not be made consistently in our medical system.”119 Both problems (1) and (3) are 
legitimate concerns. Problem (1) highlights the difficulties mentioned above; on the other 
hand, problem (3) points out that even if it were possible to do so on a local level, 
consistent assessment could not be ensured across different organizations.120 A mistake in 
evaluating the moral responsibility of patients with end-stage ALD might mean denial of 
vital organs and a high probability of death. Unless these technical difficulties are 
overcome, there is a moral imperative to remain cautious and to avoid using moral 
responsibility as legitimate criteria for allocating life-sustaining organs.121 
 
5.3 The Provider-Patient Relationship in the Context of Alcoholism 
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 The difficulty of understanding pain and suffering is well known.122 Providers 
encounter numerous difficulties in attempting to provide adequate relief to alcoholic 
patients who struggle with morbidity and, ultimately, mortality.123 As Daniel Callahan 
notes, human nature fixes no singular response to suffering, and for this reason it is often 
arduous for providers to ascertain the behavior it might induce or the meaning it may 
carry for a particular patient. Hence, compassionate medical care is necessarily 
idiosyncratic; it must be tailor made to fit the individual in his history, culture, and 
personal structure of understanding.124 
 
In the context of alcoholism, the provider-patient relationship can be viewed as 
the vehicle through which the relief of suffering – and so the honoring and upholding of 
the mandates of licit fiduciary relationships – is achieved. Providers cannot avoid 
becoming involved with patients and at the same time effectively allaying their suffering. 
In fact, with alcoholic patients who are suffering it is essentially impossible to be in their 
presence and remain indifferent. In its barest sense, to be concerned is to be involved.125 
Every provider fears becoming closer to suffering patients, many of whom will die, 
because such a relationship is sure to promise pain, sorrow, and loss.126 Yet it is only 
through the compassionate connection with the alcoholic patient that pertinent 
information flows to inform the provider of what the patient is feeling and even what 
existential sensations he is experiencing. Through the same compassionate bond, then,127 
the provider can offer a bridge over which the alcoholic can return from the isolation of 
suffering.128 
 
 Introducing judgments of moral desert for the allocation of scarce resources 
negatively impacts the fiduciary relationship between providers and patients. Moreover, 
such assessments of moral “worth” risk undermining the fundamental nature of medicine. 
When the alcoholic patient seeks medical assistance, one of his goals is to restore the 
autonomy that is lost to addiction. The loss of autonomy or the inability to pursue 
ordinary activities (that one could if healthy) is arguably what makes diseases and 
ailments generally horrible. And, in petitioning a provider to help restore the loss of 
autonomy, it is crucial that the provider learns about the values and preferences of the 
                                                
 122. Unlike other objects in biomedical science, persons cannot be reduced to their parts in order 
to be understood. See Cassell, The Nature of Suffering, 29-45; see especially pp. 36-41.  
 123. Cassell, The Nature of Suffering, 29-45; see especially pp. 33-35.  
 124. Daniel Callahan, The Troubled Dream of Life: In Search of a Peaceful Death (Washington, 
DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000), 120-55; see especially pp. 132-36.  
 125. At issue, then, is the degree to which the physician actively participates in that relationship. 
See Cassell, The Nature of Suffering, 278-91; see especially pp. 290-91. 
 126. Hence the often unexamined desire to hold back, cover one’s feelings with a white coat, and 
hide behind incomprehensible language. This is due in large part to the fact that such pain, sorrow, and loss 
renders useless the technical tools necessary to care for the very sick and suffering. See Cassell, The Nature 
of Suffering, 278-91; see especially p. 291. 
 127. This bond enables the endangered, fragile patient to know that the physician cab be trusted, 
and so begin to reconnect to the world through that relationship. See Cassell, The Nature of Suffering, 278-
92; see especially p. 291. 
 128. Cassell, The Nature of Suffering, 278-91; see especially pp. 290-91.  
 patient.129 In oncology care, for instance, the recommendation of a protocol typically 
hinges on nonmedical considerations. A patient might be willing to accept a lower quality 
of life brought by a chemotherapy regimen in favor of a higher success rate. A different 
patient might view the long-term survival rate as secondary while prioritizing the 
minimization of toxicity and the maintenance of a high quality of life during treatment.130 
In this sense, providers play indispensible roles as health care advocates or consultants, 
filtering the medical facts through the net of patient preferences and deriving a set of 
therapeutic recommendations that best maximize patient wishes, including how best to 
restore autonomy.131 
 
 The trust between providers and patients becomes essential if the model of 
medicine sketched above is accurate. The patient must feel comfortable that the 
information shared with the provider will not haunt or compromise his care at a later date. 
Not only must this include the frank expression medical information, but also the ability 
to share lifestyle information that can make a significant difference in determining the 
proper treatment to recommend. For example, a patient diagnosed with hepatitis who 
contracted the disease from drug use would require different care than someone who 
contracted hepatitis through a blood transfusion.132 But if the patient learns that what he 
tells the provider might significantly alter his chances of life-saving treatment, the patient 
would have every incentive to withhold information that he believes (rightly or wrongly) 
might jeopardize his interest. Given that providers can only make therapeutic 
recommendations if they possess all of the relevant information, this sort of censorship 
undermines the provider’s effectiveness as a health advocate.133 
 
 A medical model that allocates resources on the basis of moral desert also runs 
counter to its institutional commitments. Such a system would give patients with medical 
knowledge a significant advantage. They would presumably know what not to reveal to 
their providers when the information would compromise their care. The product is a 
system that would give higher priority to those who know how to manipulate it to their 
advantage.134 Those patients who do not possess such knowledge would rightly worry 
that their honesty in communication with providers might be self-destructive. Providers 
would then no longer remain caretakers; they would become judges inheriting an 
adversarial role. As long as medicine is committed to providing patients with equal care 
regardless of their medical knowledge, and as long as it believes patients should have an 
institution – a medical “safe haven” – to which to turn where they can receive medical 
advocacy, allocating resources on the basis of moral desert would undermine both of 
these goals.135 
                                                
129. This example is found in Ho, “When Good Organs Go to Bad People,” 77-83; see especially 
p. 81. 
130. This example is found in Ho, “When Good Organs Go to Bad People,” 77-83; see especially 
p. 81. 
131. Ho, “When Good Organs Go to Bad People,” 77-83; see especially p. 81. 
132. This example is found in Ho, “When Good Organs Go to Bad People,” 77-83; see especially 
p. 81.  
133. Ho, “When Good Organs Go to Bad People,” 77-83; see especially p. 81.  
134. Ho, “When Good Organs Go to Bad People,” 77-83; see especially p. 82.  
135. Ho, “When Good Organs Go to Bad People,” 77-83; see especially p. 82.  
 6. CONCLUSION 
 
 The aim and proposal of this essay has been to examine the notions of alcohol 
addiction, transplantation candidacy, and moral responsibility with the intention of 
positing the argument that employing moral desert as an allocation criteria to inhibit 
alcoholic patients from equal consideration and treatment is, and ought to remain, at odds 
with the fundamental nature of medicine and the functioning of the provider-patient 
relationship. To secure the justification of this thesis, it has drawn from the twofold 
premises that (i) compassionate medical practice – understood as the sympathetic 
willingness to enter into the existential suffering of another in order to ameliorate the 
anguish invoked by disease – rests on the fiduciary relationship shared between provider 
and patient, and (ii) allocating medical goods according to moral desert rather than 
existential disposition undermines the fundamental nature of medicine and the 
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